

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
-----061309Z 091280 /41

O P 061128Z JAN 77  
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2756  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 QUITO 0103

EXDIS

FOR DELIVERY OPENING OF BUSINESS JAN 6

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, PE, CH, BL, EC  
SUBJECT: AVOIDING WAR IN THE ANDEAN REGION

REF: STATE 314123

1. SUMMARY: GOE IS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT THE SHORT TERM PERUVIAN THREAT, AS EVIDENCED BY A DEC. 30 CONVERSATION I HAD WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING DECEMBER INDICATES THAT THE GOE'S FEARS WERE NOT MERELY MANUFACTURED FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES. HEIGHTENED WAR FEARS, IN FACT, APPEAR DUE TO: THE BREAKDOWN IN TALKS ON BOLIVIAN ACCESS TO THE SEA; CANCELLATION OF MORALES BERMUDEZ VISIT TO ECUADOR; AND, IN PARTICULAR, PERUVIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS. THE PROBLEM EMERGING FROM THIS COMPLEX OF EVENTS IS TWOFOLD: CAN

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WE REASSURE ECUADOREANS REGARDING THEIR SECURITY AND THUS REDUCE THE RISKS OF A PANICKY OVERREACTION TO FUTURE PERUVIAN THREATS; AND HOW DO WE TAKE ACTION TO PREVENT WAR IN THE REGION? OUR REACTION TO BOTH OF THESE CHALLENGES DEPENDS LARGELY ON US PERCEPTION OF HEMISPHERE SECURITY AND OUR ROLE THEREIN. THIS CABLE WILL OUTLINE MY THOUGHTS ON OPTIMUM RESPONSES ON OUR PART. END SUMMARY

2. THE EVENING OF DEC. 30 I WAS CALLED IN BY THE PRESIDENT, ADMIRAL POVEDA, WHO PROCEEDED TO EXPRESS HIS GRAVE CONCERN REGARDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT PERUVIAN TROOP DEPLOYMENTS ALONG THE ECUADOREAN BORDER. HHHHHHHE APPEALED FOR A SPEED-UP OF DELIVERY OF ARMS ON ORDER BY THE GOE. I EXPLAINED OUR PERCEPTION THAT NO PERUVIAN MILITARY ACTION IS IMMINENT AND ALSO REVIEWED PROBLEMS OF LEAD TIMES ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT. I ALSO DISCOURAGED POVEDA FROM PURSUING A PROPOSAL BEING DISCUSSED BY THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF SENDING A HIGH-LEVEL TEAM TO WASHINGTON TO PRESENT GOE VIEWS OF THE WAR THREAT DIRECTLY.

3. THIS CONVERSATION, COMING WHEN THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF GENS. DURAN AND ESPINOSA WAS LARGELY HISTORY, AND A REVIEW OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEAD ME TO A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT EMPHASIS AS TO THE CAUSES OF THE RECENT WAR SCARE IN ECUADOR THAN THAT WHICH WE REPORTED IN QUITO 9034, IN WHICH WE STRESSED DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS. EVEN IF IT WAS EXPLOITED IN THIS INSTANCE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, THERE IS A LEGITIMATE EXTERNAL THREAT REPRESENTED BY THE LARGE PERUVIAN ARMS BUILD-UP. LITTLE HAS OCCURRED, AT LEAST IN ECUADOREAN MINDS, TO ALLEVIATE THIS ORIGINAL AND MORE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN. IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT IR 6-828-0319-76, WHICH HAS BECOME SOMEWHAT OF A CAUSE CELEBRE AS THE BASIS OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MY ATTACHES AND CHILEAN ATTACHES (SEE IR 6-817-0301-76 FROM SANTIAGO), VERY CLEARLY TRANSMITS VIEWS ASCRIBED TO GOE OFFICIALS, NOT MEMBERS OF THIS MISSION. THAT IR ALSO REFLECTS FEARS BASED ON PERUVIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS, NOT  
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ECUADOREAN DOMESTIC POLITICS. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT THEREFORE IF PEOPLE WOULD FOCUS INSTEAD ON THE PERUVIANS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CLIMATE THAT ALLOWED SUCH FEARS TO BECOME CREDIBLE IN ECUADOR.

4. WE SHOULD RECALL THAT BY THE TIME MORALES BERMUDEZ VISIT TO QUITO WAS CANCELLED ON DEC. 9, TENSIONS WERE ALREADY HIGH IN THE REGION, DUE BOTH TO THE BREAKDOWN OF TALKS ON BOLIVIA'S ACCESS TO THE SEA, AND INCREASING EVIDENCE OF PERU'S ACQUISITION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT. PERU'S REACTION TO THE CANCELLATION OF THAT VISIT, BY RECALLING ITS AMBASSADOR AND MILITARY ATTACHES ON DEC. 10-11 AND BY (ACCORDING TO ECUADOREAN SOURCES) MAKING THREATENING STATEMENTS TO ECUADOREAN ATTACHES IN LIMA, COULD BE INTERPRETED IN SEVERAL WAYS, NOT THE LEAST PLAUSIBLE OF WHICH WAS PREPARATION FOR WAR. FROM THAT POINT ON THE MATTER ESCALATED. THE ECUADOREANS MOVED HALF OF THE GALAPAGOS BRIGADE TO THE BORDER AREA ON DEC. 12. AROUND DEC. 16 PERU MOVED A SECOND TANK BATTALION TO THE TUMBES AREA

AND AN AIRBORNE BATTALION TO IQUITOS, BOTH MOVES REPORTED BY EMBASSY AND DAO LIMA (LIMA 11295 AND IR 6-876-0346-76) AND ALSO REPORTED INDEPENDENTLY TO US BY ECUADOREANS (IR 6-828-0319-76).

5. WHILE IT MAY BE THAT THE PERUVIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS IN THE NORTH SIMPLY RESPONDED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF A THEATER OF OPERATIONS CONCEPT (LIMA 11295), RATHER THAN TO THE ECUADOREAN TROOP MOVE, THEIR TIMING AND DIRECTION GAVE REAL SUBSTANCE TO ECUADOREAN FEARS. IN PARTICULAR THE MOVEMENT OF AN AIRBORNE BATTALION TO IQUITOS IS TROUBLESOME. THE GOE IS CONVINCED THAT PERU COVETS ITS EASTERN OIL FIELDS. SINCE ECUADOR PRESENTS NO MILITARY THREAT IN THE AMAZON BASIN, THE ECUADOREANS -- AND, FRANKLY, I AGREE -- SEE NO PURPOSE FOR STATIONING AIRBORNE TROOPS IN IQUITOS OTHER THAN AS FORWARD STAGING FOR A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE OIL FIELDS SHOULD A CONFLICT BREAK OUT (A SECRET

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SUPPOSITION STRENGTHENED BY LIMA'S IR 6876-0351-76 AND IR 6876-0340-76). THE TANKS IN TUMBES ARE ALSO OF MAJOR CONCERN. IN 1941, LITTLE FIGHTING OCCURRED IN THE TERRITORIES ULTIMATELY TAKEN BY PERU. PERUVIAN TROOPS OCCUPIED THE ECUADOREAN COASTAL PROVINCE OF LOS RIOS (A RICH BANANA AND SUGAR PRODUCING AREA) AND THREATENED TO KEEP IT UNLESS ECUADOR AGREED TO GIVE UP THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES. ECUADOR'S PRESENT ANTI-TANK CAPABILITY IS LIMITED TO 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLES AND 2.5 IN. ROCKET LAUNCHERS (SOON TO BE AUGMENTED BY A LIMITED NUMBER OF 90 AND 106 MM RECOILLESS RIFLES) AND THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT PERU'S T55 TANKS COULD REACH GUAYAQUIL, IF THE GOP SO DESIRED.

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O P 061128Z JAN 77 MRN CORRECTION

FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2757

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY  
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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 QUITO 0103

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN 0103 VICE 0101)

FOR DELIVERY OPENING OF BUSINESS JAN 6

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMANN

6. NOR IS THERE ANY REALISTIC THREAT FROM ECUADOR RE-QUIRING PERU TO COUNTER WITH SUCH CONCENTRATION OF FORCE. WHILE SOME HOT-HEADED MID AND JUNIOR-LEVEL OFFICERS HERE HAVE ADVOCATED TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A PERU-CHILE CONFLICT TO RECOVER LOST TERRITORIES, POLICY-LEVEL OFFICERS ALL RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE DOOMED TO FAILURE. THEY ARE APPARENTLY MORE SANGUINE, HOWEVER, ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO REPEL A PERUVIAN THRUST THAN INDICATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. GIVEN THE ABOVE BACKGROUND, WE SEE TWO DISTINCT PROBLEMS: FIRST, SHOULD WE ATTEMPT TO REASSURE THE GOE WITH REGARD TO THEIR LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS AND THUS  
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REDUCE THE RISK THAT SOME FUTURE PERUVIAN PROVOCATION WILL TRIGGER A PANICKY ECUADOREAN REACTION LEADING TO A CONFLICT; AND, SECOND, HOW DO WE DEAL WITH THE LARGER PROBLEM OF THE INCREASING LIKELIHOOD OF WAR IN THE REGION OVER THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS? OUR BASIC STAKE IN THIS SITUATION DERIVES FROM A GENERAL INDISPOSITION TO SEE ARMED CONFLICT BECOME PREVALENT AMONG COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE. IN MY VIEW, THE US HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AS A PRINCIPAL GOAL THE PROMOTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER WHICH DISCOURAGES LOCAL OR REGIONAL WARS AND RESTORES PEACE QUICKLY IF THEY DO BREAK OUT. THIS IS BECAUSE: (1) THERE ARE ALWAYS STRONG PRESSURES FOR THE US TO BECOME INVOLVED UNILATERALLY, ESPECIALLY IF THE USSR OR ITS ALLIES ALREADY ARE; (2) SUCH CONFLICTS OFTEN AFFECT OTHER US INTERESTS, ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN, AND POLITICAL; (3) SUCH CONFLICTS CAN EXACERBATE DIFFERENCES AND DIVISIONS WITHIN OUR OWN SOCIETY. IT FOLLOWS THAT IN A REGION WHERE PEACE HAS BEEN THE RULE FOR MOST OF RECENT HISTORY, WE HAVE A

PARTICULAR INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE GAINS ALREADY ACHIEVED TOWARD SUCH A UNIVERSAL GOAL. MOREOVER, THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR US INVOLVEMENT ARE GREATER IN THIS REGION THAN IN ANY OTHER EXCEPT WESTERN EUROPE, GIVEN TRADITIONAL AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT "OUR BACKYARD."

8. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH THE CONDITIONS WHICH PROMOTED PEACE AMONG THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NATIONS ARE CHANGING. SINCE THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM CAME INTO BEING IN THE LATE FORTIES, I CAN-RECALL ONLY TWO CONFLICTS WHERE ARMIES OF ANY TWO OF THE MEMBERS CLASHED FORMALLY -- AND THIS IS AN AREA WHERE MILITARY REGIMES ARE THE RULE RATHER THAN THE EXCEPTION AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF DOZENS OF UNRESOLVED BOUNDARY ISSUES. ALTHOUGH THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN THE AREA MIGHT BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GOOD SENSE OF ITS HABITUDES, I STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT THE REAL REASON HAS BEEN THE IMPLIED MUSCLE THAT THE US HAS SUPPLIED TO THE OAS  
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PEACE-KEEPING ROLE. THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERED RESOLVING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES OR OTHER ISSUES BY FORCE OF ARMS HAVE ALWAYS HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EFFECT OF SUCH ACTION ON BOTH THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER OAS MEMBERS ENERGIZED AND LED BY THE US. IN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, UNILATERAL US ACTION TO INTERVENE IN LOCAL CONFLICTS HAS BECOME LESS AND LESS ACCEPTABLE TO OUR PEOPLE AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, FOR REASONS THAT ARE FAMILIAR TO US ALL.

9. THUS WHAT IS MOST ALARMING ABOUT WHAT PERU'S INTENTIONS -- WHETHER IN THE SHORT-RUN OR OVER THE LONGER-TERM -- MIGHT BE IS ITS APPARENT DISREGARD FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE DISDAIN WITH WHICH IT SEEMS TO HAVE DISCOUNTED THE REACTION OF THE US. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 30 YEARS WE SEEM TO BE FACED WITH A DEVELOPING CRISIS WHICH IS BEING PRECIPITATED NOT BY A SERIES OF ACCIDENTS AND ESCALATING RESPONSES, BUT BY A COLD AND CALCULATED PROJECTION OF MILITARY FORCE FOR THE NARROWEST OF NATIONALIST AND IRREDENTIST MOTIVES. THE PERUVIAN ARMS BUILD-UP, GIVEN ITS HISTORICAL PROBLEMS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, REPRESENTS IN ITS LONGER-RUN PROJECTION A CLEAR AND DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND TO THE TRADITIONAL US UNDERWRITER ROLE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HEMISPHERIC PEACE. SHOULD THE ENTERPRISE SUCCEED, OTHERS SIMILAR IN NATURE MAY FOLLOW. WHAT WE ARE FACED WITH THEN IN THIS PROBLEM IS THE THREAT OF THE BEGINNING OF THE UNRAVELLING OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING IT WITH NEO-DARWINIAN NOTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US HEGEMONY WHICH BACKED-UP THE SYSTEM'S PEACEKEEPING

CAPABILITY IS FADING FAST, AT LEAST FROM THE SOUTH  
AMERICAN CONTINENT. AS I TRIED TO POINT OUT IN QUITO 8937,  
THE TRADITIONAL ULTIMATE THREAT -- ARMED INTERVENTION BY  
THE US -- IS NO LONGER CREDIBLE, AND WHILE I DON'T AGREE  
WITH JOHN CRIMMINS THAT ECONOMIC SACTIONS ARE ALSO NOT  
FEASIBLE (WE'VE BEEN WILLING TO TRY THEM OFTEN ENOUGH IN  
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INVESTMENT DISPUTES) I DO AGREE THAT THEY WOULD BE DIFFICULT  
TO IMPLEMENT UNILATERALLY WITH A DEGREE OF INTENSITY  
NECESSARY TO HAVE A REAL EFFECT.

10. HENCE WE ARE LEFT WITH A MECHANISM FOR MULTILATERAL DIP-  
LOMACY THAT IS NO LONGER SIMPLY A FIG-LEAF FOR US POWER, NEVERTHE-  
LESS, I ENDORSE THE APPROACH RECOMMENDED BY JOHN CRIMMINS: THAT  
OF STIMULATING A MULTILATERAL EFFORT. IT IS FAR PREFERABLE,  
EVEN IF ITS SUCCESS IS PROBLEMATICAL, TO DOING NOTHING.  
WHILE SHARING HIS CONCERN THAT SUCH AN EFFORT ULTIMATELY  
BE PLACED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, I  
AGREE THAT SOME MORE INTIMATE FORUM MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE  
AT LEAST AT EARLY STAGES. FORTUNATELY, THE VERY LOCATION  
OF THE TENSION GIVES A FINE HOOK ON WHICH TO HANG SUCH AN  
EFFORT: IT IS AN ANDEAN PROBLEM WHOSE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE  
INITIATED BY ANDEAN STATES (I ASSUME THAT CHILE STILL RE-  
TAINS TIES TO AND CONSIDERS ITSELF AN ANDEAN COUNTRY).  
THUS COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA WOULD BE CENTRAL TO THE EFFORT,  
AND OUR ATTEMPTS TO ENERGIZE IT SHOULD FOCUS ON THEM. I  
THINK BOTH BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA HAVE VALID ROLES TO PLAY.  
I DO SHARE WITH JOHN CONCERN OVER THE PROPER ROLE FOR BRAZIL  
GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS ARE ALL SENSI-  
TIVE TO REAL OR IMAGINED BRAZILIAN AMBITIONS IN THE REGION.  
ARGENTINA IS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL TIES IT HAS  
WITH BOLIVIA AND IS CREATING WITH CHILE.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO  
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AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 QUITO 0103

EXDIS

FOR DELIVERY OPENING OF BUSINESS JAN 6

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMANN

11. I RECOMMEND THAT THE USG INITIATE, AT AN EARLY DATE, DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA IN ORDER TO APPRISE THEM OF OUR IMMEDIATE AND LONG-RANGE CONCERNS, TO SEEK THEIR COOPERATION IN FINDING A SOLUTION, AND -- SIGNIFICANTLY-- TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO TAKE THE LEADERSHIP ROLE BOTH IN MAKING DEMARCHES TO THE PERUVIANS AND IN FINDING THAT SOLUTION. THE APPROACH SHOULD PROBABLY BE MADE INITIALLY THROUGH OUR EMBASSIES AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF EACH GOVERNMENT. ONCE THE COLOMBIANS AND VENEZUELAN ARE ENLISTED, THEY SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO APPROACH THE BRAZILIANS AND ARGENTINES. A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR THIS TYPE OF MULTILATERAL APPROACH MIGHT BE THE RECENT PEACEKEEPING EFFORT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THAT EFFORT WAS LARGELY ORCHESTRATED BY THE CENTRAL AMERICANS THEMSELVES.

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12. MY REASON FOR SUGGESTING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN MODEL IS THAT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ASSESS VERY CAREFULLY OUR ROLE IN THE ENTIRE EFFORT. WHILE OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION MAY BE FEASIBLE, I'M NOT CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD BE EITHER ESSENTIAL OR EVEN ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHERS. AFTER THE INITIAL APPROACH, WE MIGHT BEST SERVE AS AN INTERESTED AND HELPFUL OBSERVER, PROVIDING MORAL ENCOURAGEMENT ALONG WITH FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (E.G., RECONNAISSANCE) AND ACTING MORE TO KEEP THE EFFORT ON TRACK THAN TO DIRECT IT. I FEAR THAT AN EFFORT OBVIOUSLY INITIATED, LED AND PROMOTED BY THE USG MIGHT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE COUNTRIES WE WISH TO BE MOST INVOLVED AND THOSE WE WISH TO AFFECT.

13. I RECOMMEND A MULTILATERAL APPROACH WITH SOME TREPIDATION AND WITH FULL REALIZATION OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED

IN CARRYING SUCH AN EFFORT OFF. I AM LESS SANGUINE THAN JOHN CRIMMINS THAT THE FOUR COUNTRIES WILL LEAP INTO ACTION. WE WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME A HEAD-IN-THE-SAND ATTITUDE AMONG KEY COUNTRIES AND I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF TENSION IS HIGH ENOUGH TO OVERCOME THAT RELUCTANCE. IN ADDITION WE WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME THE TRADITIONAL LATIN DISINCLINATION TO OFFEND THEIR NEIGHBORS UNNECESSARILY, AND WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THIS EFFORT CAN BE MADE WITHOUT OFFENDING ONE OR MORE OF THE DIRECTLY AFFECTED STATES.

14. WE SHOULD ALSO ENTER THIS EFFORT WITH A VERY FRANK, REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS, EVEN IF WE DO MANAGE TO ENERGIZE A TRUE MULTILATERAL EFFORT. THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR -- AND PERHAPS THE MOST WE SHOULD BE SEEKING -- IS TO ALLEVIATE THE IMMEDIATE TENSIONS AND LESSEN THE MID-TERM (2-3 YEARS) THREAT OF WAR. PERHAPS BY INTERESTING OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES IN THE BASIC PROBLEM ITSELF, AND THROUGH THE EXPERIENCE THEY MAY GAIN IN FACT-FINDING OR SERVING AS INTERMEDIARIES, THIS EFFORT COULD EVENTUALLY  
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OPEN THE PATH TO A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION OF THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM. SUCH A POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, LIES IN THE FUTURE. AT THE PRESENT TIME THE FOUR COUNTRIES DIRECTLY AFFECTED FEEL THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST SO MUCH AT STAKE AND ARE SO SENSITIVE TO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE WHICH AFFECTS OR SEEMS TO AFFECT THAT INTEREST THAT EVEN ACHIEVING OUR IMMEDIATE AND MID-TERM GOALS WILL BE DIFFICULT.

15. IN ADDITION TO STIMULATING A MULTILATERAL EFFORT, I ALSO BELIEVE THE PROPOSAL BY AMBASSADOR VAKY, AND SECONDED BY AMBASSADOR STEDMAN, FOR A SHIGH-LEVEL MEETING WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT WITH THE PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT PERU, ITS MILITARY BUILDUP AND ITS INTENTIONS, SHOULD BE ACTED UPON. THE HOLDING OF SUCH A MEETING NOT ONLY WOULD HELP CALM BOLIVIA AND ECUADOR; IT IS PROBABLE THAT THEY EXPECT IT. WHILE THE STRONGER AND LARGER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS MAY INCREASINGLY RESENT US "INTERVENTION" TO MAINTAIN PEACE, THE SMALLER COUNTRIES SELECTIVELY EXPECT AND DESIRE IT AS A PROTECTION AGAINST THEIR LARGER AND, AS SOMETIMES PERCEIVED, AGRESSIVE LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBORS. SUCH AN APPROACH ALSO WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE PERUVIANS IN DECIDING UPON FUTURE ACTIONS, AND WHILE THE USG MAY NOT KNOW ENTIRELY WHAT IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO IN THE EVENT OF PERUVIAN AGGRESSION, NEITHER DO THE PERUVIANS. THE CONVERSATION ITSELF MAY HAVE SOME DETERRENT EFFECT AGAINST RASH ACTIONS BY THE PERUVIANS.



16. VIS-A-VIS ECUADOR, OUR MOST POTENT WEAPONS WOULD SEEM TO BE VERBAL REASSURANCE AND A SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE TOWARD ECUADOREAN ARMS REQUESTS. WE CAN INDICATE TO THE GOE OUR RECOGNITION THAT THEY ARE FACED BY A TRADITIONAL ENEMY ARMED WITH A WEALTH OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. WE CAN ATTEMPT TO REASSURE THE GOE THAT WE PERCEIVE THE THREAT AND ECUADOR'S DESIRE TO ACHIEVE A MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE DEFENSE. WE CAN, WITHIN LIMITS OF DELIVERY CAPABILITY  
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AND GENERAL US ARMS SALES POLICY, OFFER A MORE SYMPATHETIC EAR TO ECUADOREAN REQUESTS FOR DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT. IN SUM, WE SHOULD TAKE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO BOOST ECUADOR'S MORALE AND AVOID THE SITUATION WHERE, ACTING OUT OF DESPERATION, THE GOE MIGHT TAKE THE PRECISE STEPS WHICH WOULD PRECIPITATE THE RESULT WE WISH TO AVOID. THE SUCCESS OF SUCH EFFORTS, HOWEVER, (AND THE MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL HONESTY WITH WHICH WE CAN PURSUE THEM) ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON OUR SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH THE OVERALL PROBLEM OF ELIMINATING THE POSSIBILITY OF GENERAL CONFLICT.  
BLOOMFIELD

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## Message Attributes

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